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We consider the problem of computing with encrypted data. Player A wishes to know the 
value f(x) for some x but lacks the power to compute it. Player B has the power to compute 
/ an is willing to send f(y) to A if she sends him y, for any y. Informally, an encryption 
scheme for the problem f is a method by which A, using her inferior resources, can transform 
the clearfext instance x into a encrypted instance y, obtain f(y) from B, and infer f(x) from 
f(y) in such a way that B cannot infer x from y. When such an encryption scheme exists, we 
say that f is encryptable. The framework defined in this paper enables us to prove precise 
statements about what an encrypted instance hides and what it leaks, in an information- 
theoretic sense. Our definitions are cast in the language of probability theory and do not 
involve assumptions such as the intractability of factoring or the existence of one-way 
functions. We use our framework to describe encryption schemes for some well-known 
functions. We also consider the following generalization of encryption schemes. Player A, who 
is limited to probabilistic polynomial time, wishes to guess the value f(x) which probability st 
least 4 + l/lx]’ of being correct, for some constant c. Player B can compute any function and 
generate arbitrary probability distributions. Players A and B can interact for a polynomial 
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number of rounds by sending polynomial-sized messages. We prove a strong negative result: 
there is no such generalized encryption scheme for SAT that leaks at most 1x1 (unless the 
polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level). 0 1989 Academic PKSS, IUC. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose your private computer lacks the power needed to compute a function of 
importance to you. You have access to a computing center that does have the 
resources to compute this function. You would like to take advantage of these 
public resources but not to expose your confidential data. Is it possible to encrypt 
the data before sending it to the computing center and still to make sense out of the 
answer returned? 
We consider the general problem of computing with encrypted data. Player A 
wishes to know the value f(x) for some x but lacks the power to compute it. Player 
B has the power to compute f and is willing to send f(y) to A if she sends him y, 
for any y. Informally, the function f is encryptable if there are two efficiently com- 
putable functions E and D such that E maps the cleartext instance x to an encrypted 
instance y, D maps f(y) to f(x), and nothing about x can be inferred from y, even 
with unbounded computing power. Note that player B has enough power to com- 
pute the hard function f and therefore presumably to crack a cryptosystem based 
on intractability assumptions. Furthermore, B may not guarantee the privacy of the 
encrypted data: for example, nothing sent to a public computing center is secure. 
In short, we do not know who will see the encrypted data or how he may try to 
tamper with it, but we know that he will be thwarted as long as x is hidden 
information-theretically. 
The requirement that the encrypted instance y reveal nothing about the cleartext 
instance x may be unrealistic and unnecessary. For example, A may only be 
concerned about concealing the high-order bits of x. In this case, a pair of functions 
E and D that allow her to obtain f(x) and conceal the high-order bits of x would 
be acceptable, even if B could infer something else about x from y, such as the 
approximate size of x or the least significant bit of x. We develop the machinery 
needed to prove that E hides at least some function H(x) or that E leaks at most 
some function L(x). 
In this paper, we give examples of natural encryptable functions and establish a 
strong negative result about the encryptability of NP-hard functions. There are four 
motivations for this work. First, there is the immediate, practical application of the 
computing center senario. Second, encryption schemes can be used as building 
blocks in cryptographic protocols. Third, it is interesting that we can establish 
precise negative results, because these are difficult to come by in cryptography. 
Fourth, encryptability turns out to be related to fundamental concepts in com- 
plexity theory, such as nonuniformity and random-self-reducibility. 
A typical result connecting encryptability to complexity is: the functions for 
which there exist efficient encryption schemes that leak nothing are exactly the 
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functions computable in expected polynomial time. Although not difficult, this 
theorem is important, because it supports the intuition that functions that are 
harder to compute are harder to encrypt. More precisely, if f is hard to compute, 
then A cannot hope to hide everything about x. 
In order to obtain general results about the encryptability of a wider class of 
functions, we examine what happens when L(x) is nontrivial. For example, we 
investigate which functions can be encrypted if A is willing to leak the size of x. The 
first observation to make is that any naive approach to a general result about these 
functions is doomed to fail. Consider the function f(x) that is 1 if the Turing 
machine encoded by 1x1 halts on all inputs and 0 otherwise. Then f is not recursive, 
but A can certainly consult B while hiding everything about x except 1x1: she can 
choose a random y for which 1 yl = 1x1 and ask for f(y). 
This example shows that it is not obvious how to establish a precise theorem 
about what functions can be encrypted leaking at most 1x1. There is no simple 
connection between how hard f is to encrypt and how hard it is to compute. 
However, we can show a precise relationship between how hard f is to encrypt 
and how hard f is to compute with the aid of a polynomial advice function, as 
developed by Karp and Lipton in their study of nonuniform complexity classes 
[KL]. This relationship leads to a negative result that holds for generalized encryp- 
tion schemes (GESs), which are defined precisely in the next section: 
MAIN THEOREM. No NP-hard function has an efficient GES that leaks at most 
L(X), for any L such that IL(x)1 = O(log 1x1) and L can be computed in nondeter- 
ministic polynomial time with the aid of a polynomial advice function, unless the 
polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level. For instance, SAT cannot he 
encrypted leaking at most 1x1. 
To prove this theorem, we show that, for any such L, a function that is encryp- 
table leaking at most L(x) is itself computable in nondeterministic polynomial time 
with the aid of a polynomial advice function. We then apply a theorem of Yap that 
states that, if both yes-instances and no-instances of SAT are recognizable in non- 
deterministic polynomial time with polynomial advice, then the polynomial 
hierarchy collapses at the third level [Yap]. 
The technique we use to connect encryptability to nonuniform complexity can 
also be used to analyze random-self-reducibility [AL, TW]. Intuitively, a random- 
self-reduction is a randomized polynomial-time reduction from a set to itself that 
maps an element of size n to each other element of size n with equal probability. We 
define random-self-reducibility precisely in Section 5. Our framework enables us to 
prove some new results about it. For example, if a set is random-self-reducible, then 
it can be recognized in NP with the help of a polynomial advice function. 
Computing with encrypted data was discussed in full generality for the first time 
in [Fei]. Restricted versions were considered in [BM, RAD]. The framework that 
we establish here is superior to the one in [Fei], which did not include formal 
definitions of leaking and hiding. The definition of encryption in [Fei] was too 
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weak; it was satisfied by schemes that leaked some crucial information about the 
cleartext instance X. Here, we impose stricter requirements on encryption schemes, 
and we obtain more meaningful and intuitive results. 
Yao’s discreet functions [Yao86b] are essentially functions with generalized 
encryption schemes that leak at most the size of the cleartext instance x. Yao shows 
that there exist functions in DSPACE(SZ(2”“‘)) that cannot be encrypted in this 
sense. In contrast, we show that no NP-Hard function can be encrypted in this 
sense, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. 
Presentations of our work have elicited questions about its relationships to the 
results in [Yao82, Yao86a] and to zero-knowledge proof systems (e.g., [GHY85, 
GMR]). In short, despite surface resemblances, there are fundamental differences 
between our work and that reported in [GHY85, GMR, Yao82, Yao86a]. We 
address these differences in Appendix A below. 
In the next section, we define encryptability. In Section 3, we present nontrivial 
examples of encryption schemes and an application to secure circuit evaluation. 
Section 4 contains our main results about encryptability and complexity. We define 
and explore random-self-reducibility in Section 5. We state some open problems in 
Section 6. Appendix B contains the proof of a complexity-theoretic lemma that was 
stated without proof in [AFK]; although the lemma is not needed for the results 
given here, we include it because of its potential independent interest. 
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS 
Throughout this paper, f is the function that A is interested in but lacks the 
resources to compute. The cleartext instance x is in Dom( f ), and a key k is drawn 
from a suitable set X. The encryption function E: Dam(f) x X + Dam(f) and the 
decryption function D : Dom( f) x X x Range(f) + Range(f) are both partial, 
deterministic functions. When A wants to compute the value f(x) with the help of 
B, she chooses a key k, computes y = E(x, k), sends y to B, gets back f(y), and 
computes f(x) = D(x, k, f(y)). 
Let X, K, and Y be random variables defined on Dom( f ), the key space Xx, and 
Range(E), respectively. The a priori probability that A wants to know the value 
f(x) is P(X= x). A uses a sampling procedure k( ) to draw keys from X according 
to the distribution of K. The distribution of Y is induced by the joint distribution of 
X and K, namely, P( Y = y ) = &x,k) = y P(X= x, K = k). 
We assume that B knows the encryption scheme and the joint distribution of X 
and K. The functions L and H, both defined on Dom(f ), are such that B can 
compute L(x) if he knows y but cannot compute H(x). Just as Y = E(X, K) is a 
random variable induced by X and K, so L(X) and H(X) are random variables 
induced by X. 
The following definitions express formally what properties E must have if A is to 
be able to hide at least H while leaking at most L. 
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DEFINITION. An encryption function E for f leaks at most L if, for all a priori 
distributions on X, for all z E Range(L), the random variables X and Y are indepen- 
dent given L(X) = z. 
DEFINITION. The encryption function E for f hides at least H if, for all a priori 
distributions on X, the random variables H(X) and Y are independent. 
In other words, if E encrypts f leaking L, then B learns nothing new about x 
from the encrypted instance y if he already knows that L(x) = z. Similarly, if E 
hides H, then A reveals no information about H(x) when she sends y to B. 
Our main theorem holds for generalized encryption schems (GESs), which we 
now define. As before, a GES for f entails deterministic encryption and decryption 
algorithms E and D, and a randomized key-sampling algorithm k( ). In a GES, 
however, A’s queries to the oracle B need not be elements of Dam(f), and B’s 
responses need not be elements of Range(f); they can be drawn from arbitrary sets, 
which we denote by d and 9?. 
DEFINITION. A generalized encryption scheme (GES) is a two-party protocol 
with the following properties: 
(I) There are m rounds of communication. Denote A’s ith message by ai and 
B’s ith message by bi. 
(II) On cleartext input x, A computes an encryption key k = k(x) before she 
initiates communication with B. This one key is used by A in each round and in 
decryption. 
(III) The encryption algorithm E takes inputs of the form (x, k, 6), where 
x E Dam(f), k E X, and 6 is a list of elements of 39, and produces outputs in d. In 
round i of the protocol, A computes ai = E(x, k, 6) and sends it to B; the list 6 must 
be of length i - 1 and consist of B’s responses b, , . . . . bi_ 1 to A’s previous queries. 
Thus, in round 1, the list 6 is empty, and the query a, is a function of x and k. 
(IV) B draws his responses b,, . . . . b, from any distibution on 9 that satisfies 
property (V) below. 
(V) The decryption algorithm D takes inputs of the form (x, k, h), where 
6= b,, . . . . b, is a list of m elements of $3. If k and 6 are the results of an execution of 
the protocol, then D(x, k, 6) =f(x) with probability at least l/2 + l/IxI’, for some 
constant c. 
To extend the definitions of leaking and hiding so that they apply to GES’s, 
simply replace the random variable Y with a vector of random variables 
( Y, , . . . . Y, ), where m is the number of rounds. 
Of course, we are particularly interested in encryption schemes that are practical 
as well as effective. Thus, in this paper, we restrict attention to schemes in which E 
and D terminate in polynomial time, k( ) terminates in expected polynomial time, 
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we can check in polynomial time whether a particular key k is valid for a cleartext 
instance x, and Ik(x)l, m, and ]b,] through lb,1 are polynomial in 1xl.l It is 
possible to develop an analogous theory in which everything is “scaled up,” i.e., the 
functions E, D, and k( ) are of higher complexity, keys are longer, and there is a 
larger number of rounds of interaction with longer messages. 
On meaningless inputs, such as strings x that are not in Dam(f) or lists 6 of 
answers that a correct player B would never have produced in response to a 
sequence of queries about x, the functions E, D, and k( ) are required to terminate 
as quickly as they do on meaningful inputs, but they are not required to produce 
meaningful output. In particular, they are not required to recognize that an input x 
is not in Dam(f) or to detect that a particular message bi could not have been 
produced by a correct oracle B. Indeed, they cannot be required to do so, because 
we give encryption schemes in Section 3 for functions f whose domains are not 
known to be recognizable in polynomial time, and player B, by definition, has 
sufficient computational resources to produce responses that A cannot produce or 
even verify. 
In the case in which J is a predicate, we discuss briefly encryption schemes that 
may leak extra information about no-instances. We relate these schemes to the 
theory of random-self-reducibility. 
3. EXAMPLES AND APPLICATIONS 
Here we give encryption schemes for three well-known number-theoretic 
functions. The natural reductions that use for encryption have been used before in 
the study of discrete logarithms and quadratic residues (e.g., [AL]). 
THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM (DLP). The DLP function f takes as 
arguments a prime p, a generator g for Z,*, and an integer u such that (u, p) = 1. The 
value f(u, g, p) is the unique exponent e E Cl, p - l] for which g’ G u mod p. The key 
space X used in the encryption scheme is Z. The answer to the encrypted instance is 
denoted by e’. 
’ Throughout this paper, we mean the following when we say that a function f is computable in 
expected polynomial time. There is an algorithm ALG, that always returns the correct value f(x) on any 
input x E Dam(f). The algorithm ALG/ uses a source of randomness, and its expected running time, 
which is a function of the input x and the distribution on these random choices, is bounded by a 
polynomial in 1x1, for all inputs X, including those that are not in Dam(f). Note that we do not mean 
that the expected running time is computed with respect to a distribution on the inputs. For example, if 
f is the characteristic function for a set S, and f is computable in expected polynomial time, then 
SE ZPP; in this case, Dam(f) is all of (0, 1 }*. If ALG is an algorithm that computes a sample point of 
a distribution instead of a single-valued function (e.g., the key-sampling algorithm k( ) of an encryption 
scheme), then the same requirements hold: ALG terminates in expected polynomial time on all inputs 
and gives a correct answer on all meaningful inputs. 
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Return(An element of [ 1, p - 1 ] chosen uniformly at random); 
\ 
E((u, &T> P>. k) 
Return( (u g’ mod p, g, p)); 
) 
Return(e’ -k mod p - 1); 
1 
THE QUADRATIC RESIDUOSITY PROBLEM (QRP). The QRP function f takes two 
arguments, an integer n that is the product of two distinct primes p and q, with 
p = q = 3 mod 4, and an integer u such that (u, n) is 1 and the Jacobi symbol (X) is 
+ 1. ( We could use a wider class of n’s-for example, the so-called Blum 
integers-but the increased generality is not needed to illustrate encryptability.) The 
value f(u, n) is 1 if there is an integer a such that a2 = u mod n, and f(u, n) is 0 
otherwise. Note that the Jacobi symbol (f) can be computed in polynomial time using 
the Reciprocity Law and that, if n has the specified form, then f( - 1, n) is 0. We use 
Z,*[ + l] to denote the integers in [ 1, n - l] that are relatively prime to n and have 
Jacobi symbol + 1. The key space X is Z x { 0, 1 }, and the answer to the encrypted 
instance is denoted by e’. 
Choose z uniformly at random from [ 1, n - 1 ] 
While (2, n) > 1 or (f) = - 1; 
Choose E uniformly at random from { 0, 1 }; 
Return( (z, 8)); 
1 
E((u, n>. (z. E)) 
I 
If&=0 
Then Return( (uz2 mod n, n)); 
Else Retum( ( - uz* mod n, n) ); 
b(<u, n>, (z, E), e’) 
i 
Ife=O 
Then Return(d); 
Else Return( 1 -e’); 
1 
THE PRIMITIVE ROOT PROBLEM (PRP). The PRP function f takes as arguments a 
prime p and an integer u that is relatively prime to p. The value f(u, p) is 1 if u 
generates the cyclic group Z: (i.e., if u is a primitive root mod p), and 0 otherwise. 
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The key space X is Z, and once again the answer to the encrypted instance is denoted 
by e’. 
k(<u, P>) 
{ 
Do 
Choose an odd k uniformly at random from [ 1, p - l] 
While(k,p-l)>l; 
Return(k); 
k<u, p>. k) 
Return( (uk mod p, p)); 
1 
@(u, P>, k e’) 
{ 
Return( 
)/*.Wmodp,p)=f(u,p)if(k,p-l)=l*/ 
In all of these encryption schemes, the functions E, D, and k( ) have the required 
properties, i.e., E and D terminate in polynomial time, k( ) terminates in expected 
polynomial time and produces keys of length polynomial in 1x1, and the fact that a 
key k is valid for a cleartext instance x can be checked in polynomial time. To see 
that the function k( ) in the PRP scheme runs in expected polynomial time, note 
that p - 1 has fewer than log p distinct prime factors, whereas the total number of 
distinct primes less than p is proportional to p/log p; hence the number of valid 
keys for each pair (u, p - 1) can be bounded below trivially by Q( p/log p), and we 
can expect to find one by trial and error in O(log p) trials. 
THEOREM 1. The encryption scheme given for the DLP leaks at most g and p. 
The scheme for the QRP leaks at most n. The scheme for the PRP leaks at most p 
and the order of u mod p. 
Prcof: The crucial idea in all three proofs is that, as long as k is chosen 
uniformly, the distribution of Y given L(X) is also uniform, regardless of the 
a priori distribution of X. The proofs of the first two statements are nearly identical, 
and so we only give the first. 
Consider the random variables X and Y given L(X) = (g, p). We wish to 
show that they are independent. Let x = (u, g, p) and y = (v, g’, p’), where 
( g’, P’ > # < g, p>. For any such y, 
and 
p(~=xlw-)=<g~ P)).P(Y=YlLW)= (g, P>) 
are the same, because they are both 0. Thus, we may assume that x = (u, g, p) and 
Y= cv,g, P> and deal with unconditional probabilities to prove independence. 
P(X=x, Y=ylLW)= (g, P>) 
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For each such x and y, there is a unique key k such that E(x, k) = y. This key is 
f(UU? mod p, g, p), and we denote it k,,. Note that k is chosen independently of 
U. For all such y, 
P(Y=y)= c P(X=x, K= kry) 
1 
=p-l’ 
We complete the proof of independence as follows: 
P(X=x, Y=y)=P(X=x, K=k,) 
=P(X=x)d’(K=k,) 
1 
=P(X=x) .- 
P-l 
=P(X=x).P(Y=y). 
The encryption function E given for PRP leaks more than those given for DLP 
and QRP. Let order,(u) be the smallest exponent e such that t.8 E 1 mod p and 
let O,(U) = {z E Z:: order,(z) = order,(u)}. In the scheme given, if (u, p) = 
E( (u, p ), k), then order,(u) = order,(u), and thus E leaks order,(u). 
As in the proof for the DLP scheme, we may assume that x = (u, p) and 
y = (u, p), where order,(u) = order,(u), for otherwise 
P(X=x, Y= ylL(X)= (p, order,(u))) 
and the product 
P(X=xlL(X)=(p,order,(u))).P(Y=ylL(X)=(p,order,(u))) 
are the same, because they are both 0. For any such X, the key k may assume 
c$( p - 1) distinct values, exactly #(p - 1) .I O,( u)l --I of which satisfy uk c u mod p. 
Let XX, denote this set of keys. Note that, once again, k is chosen independently of 
u; the probability that a key in XX,, is chosen is IX,/ .(#(p- l)))‘, that is, 
lO,(u)l -l. 
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The proof of independence follows immediately: 
P(X=x, Y=y)=P(X=x,KEXJ 
= P(X= x) . P(KE X,) 
=P(X=x)*IO,(u)l-’ 
=P(X=x).P(Y=y). 1 
We can use the fact that our scheme for encrypting PRP instances leaks at most 
p and order,(u) to devise a scheme for DLP that leaks at most p. In the revised 
scheme, A chooses ci, uniformly from { 1, . . . . p - 1 }, and c2, uniformly from the 
integers less than p and relatively prime to p - 1. The encrypted instance that she 
sends to B is (u’, g’, p), where g’ E g’* mod p and U’ E U. g’* mod p. If 
e’=f(<u’, g’, P>), then.f(<u, g, P))=c~-c~. 
These three examples are meant to illustrate our ideas and not to be an 
exhaustive list of encryptable functions. Others, such as inverse-RSA, can be 
encrypted using similar schemes. 
Before proceeding to our main results, which relate encryptability to com- 
putational complexity, we mention an application of the results in this section. We 
propose a protocol for secure circuit evaluation. See, e.g., [GHY87, Yao82, Yao86a] 
for a thorough discussion of secure circuit evaluation in the cryptographic model. 
Suppose that we make the following changes to our model. Instead of assuming 
that B has oracular power, say that he has knowledge of a secret algorithm-more 
concretely, that he has a circuit that computes f: In this new model, we seek a 
protocol by which B can guide A through the circuit, ultimately revealing f(x) to 
A, while A conceals x from B and B conceals the circuit from A. 
In [AF], Abadi and Feigenbaum use our encryption function for the QRP as a 
building block in a secure-circuit-evaluation protocol that is much simpler than the 
ones that have appeared previously. In this protocol, the circuit for f is hidden 
unconditionally from A, while the data x remain confidential only under the 
quadratic residuosity assumption (QRA). It is also shown in [AF] that some 
complexity-theoretic assumption, although not necessarily the QRA, is needed to 
prove the security of a two-player circuit evaluation protocol. 
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4. MAIN RESULTS: ENCRYPTABILITY AND COMPLEXITY 
We turn now to some basic results about the connection between the difficulty of 
encrypting instances off and the complexity of computing J: 
THEOREM 2. Zf f is computable in expected polynomial time, then f is encryptable 
hiding x. Conversely, if there is an encryption scheme ,for f that hides 1.~1, then ,f is 
computable in expected polynomial time. 
Proof: Suppose that f is computable in expected polynomial time. We exhibit 
an encryption scheme for f that hides x. Let x0 be a fixed element of Dom(f ): 
Return(&)); 
a 
D(x, k, e’) 
Return(k); 
In other words, if we make the (natural) assumption that A can compute 
everything that is computable in expected polynomial time, then she can just 
compute the function herself and not reveal anything to B. 
Now suppose that f is encryptable hiding 1x1, with encryption function E, 
decryption function D, and key space X. Let x0 be a fixed element of Dam(f). 
Because E runs in polynomial time, there is a fixed polynomial pO such that, for 
any k E X’, if E(x,, k) is defined, it is bounded in length by p,,( jx,,j). Let 
Y, = { y,, . . . . y,} be the set of instances off that have size at most p,,( 1x01). Note 
that T is a constant. The encryption function E cannot map x0 to an instance 
outside YO. 
Let x be an arbitrary cleartext instance. Because E hides 1x1, it cannot take x to 
an instance outside YO. Thus, the range of E is finite, and we can precompute the 
values E, = f ( y) for y E Range(E). We can now state an expected polynomial-time 
algorithm for f: 
.f(x) 
, 
Choose a key k; /* This is the expected polynomial-time step. */ 
)’ := E(x, k); 
Lookup sy ; 
Return(D(x, k, Ed)); 
i I 
57109.1-3 
32 ABADI,FEIGENBAUM, AND KILIAN 
Using a similar proof, we could characterize the functions with GESs that leak 
nothing, but this simpler version of the theorem illustrates its main point: if A can 
hide the size of an instance, then she can hide everything about the instance; 
however, if this is the case, then f must be easy to compute. One might hope for a 
generalization of Theorem 2 to say that functions that are harder to compute are 
also harder to encrypt. This hope was dashed by the Turing machine example of 
Section 1. 
That example generalizes as follows: if f(x) = g( /xl),, for some g, then f is 
encryptable leaking 1x1. By considering functions g of complexity 0(2’“), 0(2*‘“), 
etc., we get a family of increasingly difficult f’s, all encryptable leaking 1x1. At first 
glance, this family, of functions seems pathological. The results below show that this 
intuition is correct. 
We now temporarily restrict attention to boolean functions f for which 
Dam(f)= (0, l}*; we relax the first restriction at the end of this section, Suppose 
that f is the characteristic function for the set S. When we refer to an encryption 
scheme for S, we mean an encryption scheme for f; when we say that f is in certain 
complexity class, we mean that S is in that class. 
Assuming that the polynomial hierarchy (PH, [Sto]) does not collapse at the 
third level, we show that SAT is not encryptable leaking 1x1. 
These results rely on a connection between encryptability and nonuniform com- 
plexity. Specifically, we make use of the theory of polynomial advice functions 
developed by Karp and Lipton [KL]. For convenience, we repeat the necessary 
definitions. 
If SC (0, l}* and h is a function JV+ (0, l}*, then S: h= {x s.t. h(lxl).x~S}, 
where the symbol . denotes concatenation of strings. If V is a class of sets and F a 
class of functions, then V/F= {S: h s.t. SE V and h E F}. Intuitively, V/F is the class 
of sets that can be recognized given the power needed to recognize sets in V plus an 
amount of advice bounded in length by functions in F. Examples of well-studied 
nonuniform classes are P/log and P/poly, which is equivalent to the class of sets 
accepted by families of small circuits [Pip]. 
Before proceeding to the roof of our main theorem, we can explain the Turing 
machine example of Section 1 and its generalizations described above. Any function 
of x whose value depends only on 1x1 is clearly encryptable leaking Ix]. It is also 
clearly in P/poly. Karp and Lipton showed that no NP-hard function is in P/poly, 
assuming that the PH does not collapse at the second level. Hence, under the same 
assumption, no NP-hard function is trivially encryptable leaking 1x1 by virtue of 
having values determined only by 1x1. This still leaves open the possibility that an 
NP-hard function could have a nontrivial encryption scheme that leaks 1x1. In the 
proof of our main theorem, we eliminate this possibility, under a slightly stronger 
assumption than that of Karp and Lipton, i.e., that the PH does not collapse at the 
third level. 
THEOREM 3. Zf SAT has a GES that leaks at most 1x1, then the PH collapses at 
the third level. 
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It s&ices to prove: 
LEMMA 1. If f has a GES that leaks at most 1x1, then f is in the nonuniform 
complexity class NP/poly n CoNP/poly. 
LEMMA 2. u SAT is in CoNP/poly then NP is contained in CoNP/poly. 
Theorem 3 then follows directly from a special case of [Yap, Theorem 23; 
namely, if NP is contained in CoNP/poly, the PH collapses at the third level. 
In [AFK], we announced that, if SAT has a GES that leaks at most 1x1, then the 
PH collapses at the second level. If the conclusion of Lemma 1 were that f is in the 
nonuniform complexity class (NP nCoNP)/poly, then this theorem, which is 
stronger than the one given here, would follow from Lemma 3 of [AFK]. However, 
as we state here, the proper conclusion of Lemma 1 is that f is in NP/poly n 
CoNP/poly, which is not known to be equal to (NPn CoNP)/poly. Hence, the 
strongest statement we can make is that, if SAT has a GES that leaks at most 1x1, 
then the PH collapses at the third level. Although it is no longer needed, we give 
the proof of our former Lemma 3 because of its potential independent interest; see 
Appendix B. 
Proof qf Lemma 1. The proof relies on three basic tools: universal hashing 
[CW], polynomial advice functions, and counting. Because the entire proof is quite 
long, we first consider a simple case that illustrates its basic spirit. Suppose that 
E, D, and k( ) comprise an encryption scheme for f that leaks at most 1x1; there is 
only one round of communication, B returns f(y), for the encrypted instance y, 
and A always gets the correct value f(x) when she runs the decryption algorithm. 
Intuitively, the proof goes as follows. For each n, let J’,, = E(O”, k,), where 0” is used 
as a generic, fixed instance of size n and k, is a key valid for 0”. We can obtain y, 
and the value f( y,) from a polynomial advice function. Once we have y, and 
f( y,), we can find f(x) for any x of length n in nondeterministic polynomial time. 
using this algorithm: 
,f(x)/* Assume you know y, and f( y,), where n = Ixl.*/ 
Choose a key k such that E(x, k) = yn; 
RetWWx, k, AY,))); 
The crucial point is that if there is a key k, such that E(O”, k,) = y,,, then there 
must be a key k such that E(x, k) = y,, because E hides everything but the size of X. 
Now suppose that f has a GES that leaks no more than 1x1, which we denote by 
n for the rest of the proof. Call this GES G and its key-sampling algorithm k( ). 
Our goal is to show that this weaker hypothesis still guarantees the existence of a 
polynomial advice function with which we can compute f nondeterministically in 
polynomial time. The fact that a GES allows polynomially many rounds of com- 
mutation and allows B to return responses drawn from arbitrary distributions poses 
no barrier to the construction of an advice function. The difficulty arises because A 
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may get a wrong answer when she runs the decryption algorithm. We need some 
additional terminology and notation to address this difficulty. 
Define a transcript t to be a sequence (a,, b,), . . . . (a,,,, b,) of question/answer 
pairs exchanged during an execution of an m-round GES. Player A’s guess for the 
value f(x) will be based on x, the random key k, and the transcript t that results 
from A’s conversation with B. (Recall that A uses only one encryption key in a 
GES and that she chooses it before sending her first messages a, to B.) We denote 
this guess by A(x, k, t). For any x, transcripts occur according to a probability 
distribution. Because G leaks only n, this distribution must be the same for all 
x of size n, and hence we denote by T, the random variable that assumes this 
distribution. 
We say that transcript t is feasible for cleartext instance x and key k if there is a 
nonzero probability that the dialogue between A and B is the one denoted by t. We 
use rc(x, t) to denote the keys k such that t is feasible for x and k. Note that we can 
determine in polynomial time whether k is in rc(x, t), because A can be simulated 
relative to the sequence of B’s responses in t. 
We call a key k good for (x, t) if k is in rc(x, t) and A(x, k, t) = f(x); otherwise, 
we say that k is badfor (x, t). We denote the sets of good and bad keys for (x, t) by 
rcg(x, t) and Q(X, t), respectively. 
In our proof of the simple case of Lemma 1, the advice can be viewed as a 
generic, one-round transcript. In the more general case, we seek an advice function 
consisting of a polynomial-sized set of transcripts that allows us to compute f(x) in 
nondeterministic polynomial time. As in the simple case, the nondeterministic step 
consists of guessing a key in rc(x, t), where x is the cleartext instance and t is the 
transcript in the advice function; for GE%, we cannot get by with just one trans- 
cript, because there may be no t for which all of the sets rc,(x, t) have an element in 
common. Furthermore, GESs are allowed to compute wrong values for f(x) a cer- 
tain fraction of the time, but, in order to show that f is in NP/poly n CoNP/poly, 
we must construct an advice function that allows us to compute f(x) correctly all of 
the time. This is accomplished by including, for each transcript that is part of the 
advice, a universal hash function that allows us to distinguish good keys from bad. 
Consider the GES G for f that leaks at most n. In order to demonstrate the 
usefulness of a transcript t in an advice function for f, we would like expressions for 
quantities such as the probability that G computes the wrong value for f(x), given 
that X=x and T,, = t. The key-sampling algorithm k( ) in G is required to produce 
a valid key in expected polynomial time. We can view k( ) as a deteministic 
algorithm that has access to an infinite tape of unbiased random bits. It is useful to 
consider what happens when we limit the number of random bits available to the 
GES to some fixed polynomial number, say r(n). Each polynomial r gives rise to a 
different truncated GES G: corresponding to G. Keys in G: are just unbiased coin- 
toss sequences. Let k:( ) be the key-sampling algorithm that, on input x, returns a 
key that is a sequence of r( 1x1) unbiased random bits. Thus, for each possible clear- 
text instance x, k:( ) produces each legal key with equal probability. G; works as 
follows: for cleartext instance x, k:( ) generates a key s of r( 1x1) fair coin tosses. G: 
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then evokes k( ), the key-sampling algorithm of the original scheme G, using s as 
the tape of random bits. Once k( ) produces a key, G: continues to simulate G, 
computing A’s guess for f(x). Thus, in the case in which G: does produce a 
transcript of a conversation between A and B, it is the same one that G would have 
produced. Furthermore, G: leaks at most 1x1 if G leaks at most 1x1. 
Of course, there may be runs on which k( ) uses more than r(n) random bits, 
and, on these runs, G: produces no transcript at all. When this happens, we say that 
G: hangs. More precisely, we use the following definitions. Let K:(x, t), K;,,(.Y. t), 
and r&(x, t) denote the various key sets for G:. 
DEFINITION. hang,(x, t) = P(k( ) uses more than r(n) coin tosses [X=x A 
T, = t). 
DEFINITION. Hang,(x) = E(hang,(x, T,,)). 
In other words, Hang,(x) is the probability that G: hangs on cleartext instance x, 
if we limit the number of available random bits to r( 1x1). The expectation in the 
definition is computed over the distribution P( T,, = t). 
We now quantify the effects on the usefulness of a transcript of allowing the GES 
to make errors and truncating the random tape. 
DEFINITION. fail(x, t) = P(G computes f(x) incorrectly IX= x A T, = I). 
DEFINITION. Fail(x) = E(fail(x, T,)). 
DEFINITION. fallibility,(x, t) = P(G computes f(x) incorrectly IX= x A T,, = 
t A k( ) uses at most r(n) random bits). Note that this is also equal to P(G: 
computes f(x) incorrectly IX= x A T, = t). 
The failure rate fallibility,(x, t) of G: is greatest if G always computes f(x) 
correctly when k( ) uses more than r(n) random bits, given X= x and T,, = t. Using 
this observation and the definition of conditional probability, we obtain the upper 
bound 
fallibility,(x, t) < 
fail(x, t) 
1 - hang,(x, t)’ (1) 
DEFINITION. Transcript t is reliable fir x, with respect to the polynomial r, if 
faillibility,(x, t) < 2 p-n and hang,(x, t) < 0.1. 
Here 2-” and 0.1 may clearly be replaced by other fixed quantities that are 
“exponentially small” and “near zero,” respectively. We seek reliable transcripts for 
our advice function. Inequality (1) shows that, in order to prove that t is reliable for 
x, with respect to r, it suffices to show that 
fail(x, t) < 0.9 .2 --n and hang,(x, t) < 0.1. (2) 
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Note that truncated GE% can indeed be used to derive the kinds of expressions 
we seek. They have the convenient property that the probability that t occurs for 
cleartext instance x is directly proportional to the size of rci(x, t). Similarly, the 
probability that G; computes f(x) incorrectly given that t occurs is simply the ratio 
I&(X, t)l/jlc:(x, t)l. Thus we have the following relationships (recall that G: leaks 
at most Ix/), 
P(T,,=tIX=x,) IIC:(X~, t)l l-hang,(x,, t) 
P(T,=tJX=x,)=(rc:(x,, t)l=l-hang,(x,, t)’ 
where [xi/ = IxJ, and 
IG,& 01 fallibility,(x, t) = ,lc:(x, t)l . 
(3) 
Finally, we show that, for any fixed positive constant ci , if G is a GES for f, then 
there exist another GES G for f and a polynomial r for which 
Fail(x) < 2-“” and Hang,(x) < n-“I. (5) 
Recall that, by definition of a GES, there is a positive constant c such that 
Fail(x) < 4 - ner (in G). Certainly, it suffices to prove (5) for all c1 > c. Also by 
definition, there is a polynomial poly such that the expected number of random bits 
used by k( ) for any x is at most poly(n). Let s(n) = &‘I . poly(n). In the resulting 
truncated GES, Hang,(x) is the probability that S(x) >s(n), where S(x) is a 
random variable representing the number of random bits used by k( ) on cleartext 
instance x. The probability that S(x) >s(n) is bounded above by E(S(x))/s(n) 
[HPS, p. 1011. The expected value E(S(x)) is just poly(n), and so this upper bound 
on Hang,(x) is just n-‘l. Therefore, if G is allowed s(n) random bits, the probability 
that it either hangs or returns the wrong answer is less than 1- n-’ + n-‘l, which is 
polynomially bounded below f, because cr > c. Thus, there is another polynomial, 
say u(n), such that, if we perform u(n) runs of Gj on any input x of length n and 
take as our guess at f(x) the answer returned on a majority of those runs that do 
not hang, the probability that this guess is wrong is less than 2-‘I”. 
Let r(n) = s(n) . u(n). Here is a truncated GES G: for f that satisfies (5). On input 
x of length n, the key-sampling algorithm R:( ) for (7: performs u(n) simulations of 
k;(x), where k( ) is the key-sampling for G. Let k, through k,,,, be the keys 
obtained; if Gj hangs on the ith simulation, then R:( ) uses a special “blank” sym- 
bol for ki. For each i such that ki is not blank, G: simulates the interaction between 
A and B that occurs in G and obtains a list Ii of B’s responses. After all interaction 
is over, G: performs (at most) u(n) simulations of G’s decryption algorithm on 
inputs (x, ki, li), gets a set of guesses for f(x), and takes the majority. The protocol 
G obtained by using an infinite tape of random bits and simulating G rather than 
G: obviously satisfies the definition of a GES. It satisfies Fail(x) < 2-‘I” by the 
argument in the preceding paragraph. It also satisfies Hang,(x) < n-‘I, because the 
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probability that G: hangs is the probability that all of the simulations Gi hang, and 
each simulation hangs with probability less than K”‘, by choice of s. Thus, G is a 
GES for f that satisfies (5). 
A GES that satisfies (5) is said to be well-behaved with respect to r. In Lem- 
mas 1.1 and 1.2 below, there are implicit constants c1 for which we will need the fact 
that, if f has one GES, then it has another that is well-behaved with respect to r, 
for an appropriate polynomial r. In order to avoid obscuring the main points of the 
lemmas by making these quantities c1 and r explicit, we simply “assume without 
loss of generality that G is well-behaved.” By that, we always mean that we “assume 
without loss of generality that G is well-behaved with respect to r, where r is 
derived from the appropriate constant cl.” We also drop the r from the symbols 
hang,, Hang,, fallibility,, G:, k:( ), K’, ICY,,, and &, and from the term “reliable 
with respect to r.” The missing r is always the one derived from the implicit c,. 
We are now prepared to prove the existence of useful sets of reliable transcripts. 
LEMMA 1.1. Suppose that f has a GESG that leaks at most n. Assume, without 
loss of generality, that G is well-behaved. Then there is a positive constant c2 such 
that, for all sufficiently large n, there is a set S, of nC2 transcripts the mqjority oj 
which are reliable for all x of size n. 
Proof: We show first that, for any x of size n, if we pick a transcript t at ran- 
dom, according to the distribution on T,,, then the probability that it is reliable for 
x is bounded above 4. Because Hang(x)= E(hang(x, r,)) <O.OOl for sufficiently 
large n, the probability that hang(x, t) 2 0.1 cannot be greater than 0.01. Likewise, 
since Fail(x) = E(fail(x, T,)) < 2- 2n for sufficiently large n, the probability that 
fail(x, t)>0.9.2-” must be less than 0.01. (Both of these facts follow from the 
inequality we used in the discussion of well-behaved GESs.) Thus, the probability 
that either hang(x, t) 2 0.1 or fail(x, t) B 0.9 .2 en is no greater than 0.02. By (2) 
above, this means that the probability that a random transcript is reliable for x is at 
least 0.98, which is certainly bounded above 4. 
Consider a set S of k transcripts selected independently according to the 
distribution on T,,. We can apply the Chernoff bound for the tail of a binomial 
distribution to bound above by 2 0(-k) the probability that at most half of these 
transcripts are reliable for x [Cl. By setting k equal to n“*, for a fixed constant c2, 
we can strictly bound this probability above by 2.. n. There are only 2” possible 
values of x, and thus the probability that at most half of the transcripts in a 
randomly selected S are reliable for all x is strictly bounded above by 2” .2-” = 1 
Hence, at least one set S, that satisfies the conditions of the lemma must exist. m 
The rest of the proof of Lemma 1 consists of showing how to use universal hash 
functions to guarantee that certain sets contain only good keys and how to use 
them as advice in a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm to compute ,f(x). 
Let Hp.4 be a set of p-universal hash functions that map G’ keys to { 1, 2, . . . . 4:” 
For concreteness, we take Hp,p to be the following set of functions. Let c3 be a con- 
stant such that qC3 > 2”“‘, the number of G’ keys for cleartext instances of size n. 
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Consider the set of polynomials of degree p - 1 with coefficients in the finite field 
GF(q”); elements of this field are in turn represented as polynomials over Z,. Each 
degree-(p - 1) polynomial poly over GF(q”) corresponds to a hash function h in 
H p,4. To compute h(k), where k is a G’ key, we first plug k into poly; this gives us 
an element of GF(q”), represented uniquely as a polynomial poly’ over Z,. We 
take the constant term of poly’ to be h(k). Note that /Range(h)) = q and that each 
such h can be specified using an amount of space that is polynomial in p and 14). 
The property of Hp,q that we use is this: for any set (k,, kZ, . . . . k,} of distinct keys, 
if h E H,,, is chosen uniformly at random, then the probability that 
h(k,) = h(k,) = . . . = h(k,) 
is qpCp--l). We call a set {k,, . . . . k,} for which the values h(kJ are all the same an 
(h, p)-committee. 
In the following lemma, t is a transcript, and I, is the set of cleartext instances of 
size n for which t is reliable. As in Lemma 1.1, we assume without loss of generality 
that G is well-behaved. 
LEMMA 1.2. There is a constant d such that, for all t, there exist an integer p and 
a prime q, where p d nd and )q[ Gn”, and a function h in Hp,q for which these 
conditions hold for all x in I, : 
(A) K~(x, t) contains an (h, p)-committee, and 
(B) t&(x, t) does not contain an (h, p)-committee. 
Proof Condition (A) holds for any h in Hp,q provided that (K;(x, t)] > pq. This 
follows from the pigeonhole principle: if h maps more than pq elements to q values, 
there must be at least p elements that are mapped to the same place. We proceed to 
show that we can find p and q of the appropriate size so that a function h chosen at 
random from H,,, also satisfies (B) with positive probability. Let 
u= m$x jK’(X, t)l 
I 
and 
V= t$a; I&(x, t)l. 
I 
Because hang(x, t) < 0.1, Eq. (3) implies that 
There are at most 2” cleartext instances x in II; for each one of them, there are at 
most (,“) ways for form a committee of bad G’ keys. Hence, there are at most 
min Itc’(x, t)l 2 0.9. U. 
x E I( 
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potential committees of bad keys. (The inequality follows from Stirling’s 
approximation for the factorial function [K, p. 461.) The probability that a 
randomly selected element of H,,, maps all the elements of one of these potential 
committees to the same destination is q P(p-‘). Thus the probability that a random 
h has any committees made up entirely of bad keys is strictly bounded above by 
0 
P 
2".q. % 
We must find a constant d and integers p and q, satisfying the conditions of the 
lemma and the conditions imposed thus far in the proof, for which this probability 
is less than 1. 
The size of the G’ keys is bounded by n ‘I, for some constant d, that depends on 
the GES, but not on n. Thus, I’< 2nd’. Let q be a prime such that eV< q < 2eV; 
there must be a prime in this interval by a theorem of Chebyshev [NZ, p. 185]. 
Thus 141 < n’, where d = 2d,. We must choose p such that 
2”.q. 2 0 
P 
<2”.(2eV).pPp<1. 
Our bound on V implies that this is equivalent to 
2R+l+IOg2e+n~l-~logP< 1, 
and thus it suffices to choose p = nd. 
The last thing to check is that 1$(x, t)] > pq. To obtain this lower bound, we 
may assume that x has the maximum number of bad keys, i.e., that 
I$(x, t)] 2 min (K’(x, t)l - max IK~(x, t)l 20.9. U- V. 
x E I, .v E I, 
Under the same assumption, Eq. (4) and the definition of reliable give the bound 
2”. Vb u. 
Thus it s&ices to check that pq is strictly less than (0.9 .2” - 1) . V. Our construc- 
tion gives the strict upper bound pq < (n”. 2e) . V, which is clearly stronger for 
large n. 1 
Let t be a transcript in the set S, of Lemma 1.1, C be an (h, p)-committee, where 
h, p, and q are the values given by Lemma 1.2, and x be any instance of size n. By 
Lemma 1.2, we know that either all of the keys in C are good for (x, t), in which 
case we say that C is a good committee for x, or some of the keys in C are good for 
(x, t) and some are bad. It cannot be the case that all of the keys in C are bad. 
Thus, if CC K’(x, t) and the values A(x, k, t) are the same for all k in C, then C is a 
good committee for x. In this case, we can use any k in C to compute f(x) = 
4.~ k, t). 
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We now complete the proof of Lemma 1. We show how to use 
where I= IS,I, as advice to find f(x) in nondeterministic polynomial time. Guess a 
subset M of S,, where IMI > rlSl/2]; the transcripts in M are the ones that are 
reliable for x. For each ti in &I, guess an (hi, pi)-committee of G’ keys 
c = { ki, ) . . . . k,,} that is good for x. Verify that C forms an (hi, p,)-committee by 
checking that the values &(k,), for 1 <j< pi, are all the same. Verify that C is a 
good committee for x by checking that Cc K’(x, ti) and that the pi values 
A(x, k,, ti) are all the same. Finally, verify that the answers ,4(x, kil, ti) are all the 
same, for ti in M. We can conclude that this value is f(x). 
Note that this nonuniform procedure for computing f(x) works both when x is a 
yes-instance and when it is a no-instance. Thus, if f is the characteristic function for 
S, we have shown that S is in NP/poly and that S is in NP/poly. The latter is 
equivalent to the statement that S is in CoNP/poly [Yap, Lemma 61. 1 
Proof of Lemma 2. The crux of this proof is that, if the satisfiability of any 
formula of length IZ can be determined in CoNP with advice h(n), then the 
membership of x in any NP set T can be determined in CoNP with advice 
{h(i), 1 6 i < I}, where I is polynomial in 1x1. 
More formally: the hypothesis is that SAT = S: h = (x: h( 1x1) .x E S}, for some 
polynomial advice function h and some SE CoNP. Let T be a set in NP and let r be 
a polynomial-time, many-to-one reduction from T to SAT. That is, x E T if and only 
if r(x) E SAT. Because r is polynomial-time computable, there is a fixed polynomial 
p for which It-(x)] < p( IX/). Thus 
T= {x :h(lr(x)l).r(x)~S}, 
where 
S= {y: VcG(c, Y,}, 
for some polynomial-time predicate G. The following function h’, whose value at n 
is the concatenation of the values h(i), 1 < i < n, is a polynomial advice function 
for T: 
h’(n) = h( 1) $h(2) $ . *. $h( p(n)). 
(The character $ is a distinguished delimiter.) 
Consider 
S’= {y: (y=cr,h,$...SClp(lxl).x) h (~l,~~~~,~r(x)ES)}. 
We have 
S’={y:~c[(y=~,$a,$...$~l~~,,,).x) A G(c,c+,,,~r(x))]}~CoNP. 
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Thus 
T= {x:h(lr(x)l)r(x)~S} 
={x:h’(lxl).xES’}=S’:h’ 
is in CoNP/poly, as was to be shown. 1 
We now consider the possibility of a GES for SAT that leaks at most some 
function L other than 1x1. Following, e.g., [BLS], we use NPSV to denote the set 
of partial, single-valued functions computable by nondeterministic, polynomial-time 
transducers. A function f is in the nonuniform class NPSV/poly if there is a 
polynomial advice function h and a function g in NPSV such that f(x) = 
g(h( 1x1). x), for all x. 
COROLLARY 1. In the hypotheses of Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, the function 1x1 
can be replaced by any function L(x) such that Dam(L) = (0, 1) *, L E NPSV/poly, 
and IL(x)l = O(log /xl). 
Proof: The cornerstone of the argument in Lemma 1 is that, if f has an encryp- 
tion scheme that leaks at most 1x1, then all cleartext instances of size 1x1 are 
indistinguishable from B’s point of view. If f has a scheme that leaks at most L(x), 
where IL(x)1 = O(log Ixl), then the function L can assume at most lx/(’ values, for 
some constant c, on cleartext instances of size 1x1; thus the cleartext instances of 
size 1x1 can be partitioned into 1x1’ classes, where the instances in each class are 
indistinguishable from B’s point of view. By hypothesis, we can use polynomial 
advice to determine L(x), and thus which of these classes contains x, in nondeter- 
ministic polynomial time. We can use advice of the form { ( ti, pi, qi, hi), 1 < i $1) 
for each of the classes to determine f(x); since there are only polynomially many 
classes, the total amount of advice for instances of size 1x1 is polynomial in 1x1, and 
,f is still in NP/poly n CoNP/poly. 1 
COROLLARY 2. If SAT has a GES that leaks at most L(x), such that 
Dam(L) = (0, 1 }*, L E NPSV/poly, and IL(x)1 = O(log 1x1) then the PH collapses 
at the third level. 
Proof. By Corollary 1, this hypothesis implies that SAT is in NP/poly n 
CoNP/poly. If SAT is in NP/poly, then all of CoNP is contained in NP/poly, by a 
straightforward proof like that of Lemma 2. If CoNP E NP/poly, then the PH 
collapses at the thrid level, also by [Yap, Theorem 21. 1 
We also consider one-sided encryption schemes, that is, schemes that behave as in 
Section 2 when the cleartext instance x is a yes-instance but may leak more than 
L(x) when x is a no-instance. 
COROLLARY 3. If SAT is one-sided encryptable leaking L(x), where Dam(L) = 
(0, 1 } *, L E NPSV/poly and IL(x)1 = O(log lx\), then the PH collapses at the third 
level. 
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ProoJ Suppose that SAT has a one-sided GES that leaks at most L(x). We 
proceed, as in Lemma 1, using transcripts, hash functions, and nondeterministically 
chosen keys, to construct a nonuniform algorithm for recognizing SAT. The 
algorithm uses only polynomial-length advice strings because IL(x)1 = O(log [xl). 
Since this is a one-sided encryption scheme, it is guaranteed to leak at most L(x) 
only on yes-instances (i.e., on unsatisfiable formulas); hence the nonuniform 
algorithm is guaranteed to work only on yes-instances (unlike the one in Lemma 1). 
This is sufficient to prove that SAT ??NP/poly, which in turn implies that 
In the hypotheses of Lemma 1, Theorem 3, and Corollaries 2 and 3, SAT and 
SAT can be replaced by any total functions (not necessarily boolean) that are NP- 
hard and CoNP-hard, respectively.* The proof of Corollary 3 would not go through 
if SAT were replaced with SAT; this is because the hypothesis that SAT is one-sided 
encryptable leaking O(log 1x1) bits implies only that NP c NP/poly, which is trivial. 
5. CONNECTION TO RANDOM-SELF-REDUCIBILITY 
A random-self-reduction is essentially an expected polynomial-time reduction 
from a set to itself that maps an element of size n to each other element of size n 
with equal probability. This notion has arisen in the study of cryptography and in 
the study of zero-knowledge proofs [AL, TW]. Random-self-reducible sets are as 
hard on average as they are in the worst case. Angluin and Lichtenstein pointed out 
that this is a possible reason that these sets give rise to good candidates for one-way 
functions. Here, we define the notion precisely and show how it relates to encryp- 
tability. 
Let S be a set. It is convenient to encode elements of S as pairs (u, w). A ran- 
dom-self-reduction t is a mapping from S to S and s to s that makes use of an 
appropriate set X of keys. On input x, t chooses a key k and then computes t(x, k), 
another element of S. The key chosen is of length polynomial in 1x1, the choice of k 
takes expected time polynomial in 1x1, and the computation of t(x, k) takes worst- 
case polynomial time. Let XX be the set of keys that may be chosen on input x. In 
order to be a 
ties: 
(1) For 
(2) For 
V’ = v. 
(3) For 
probability. 
random-self-reduction, t must have the following additional proper- 
each x and each k e XX, It(x, k)l = 1x1. 
each x=(u,w) and each kEXX, if t((o, w),k)=(d,w’), then 
each x = (u, w), t outputs each (u,w’) in S of length 1x1 with equal 
’ An example of an NP-hard function that is not boolem is #SAT, where #SAT(x) is the number of 
satisfying assignments for the formula x. See [GJ, Chap. 51 for a formal definition of NP-hardness of 
general functions. 
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A random-self-reduction is a one-sided encryption function for the characteristic 
function f for S that leaks (u, 1x1, f(x)). The decryption algorithm is trivial. 
We call t a p-random-self-reduction if p is the fraction of the input that t 
fixes-in other words, if p = jul/l( v, w) 1. In general, p will be a function of 
1 (v, w)l. The smaller p is, the more randomization is achieved; so if S is O-random- 
self-reducible, there is no fixed part u, and any element of size n can be mapped 
uniformly to any other. 
The well-known examples of random-self-reducible sets are the number- 
theoretically defined sets that are ubiquitous in cryptographic applications. Indeed 
the encryption functions in Section 3 are random-self-reductions. To make this 
observation rigorous, we must express the QRP, say, as a set-recognition problem, 
which we do as follows: 
Let SQRp be the set of pairs (u, n) in which n = pq, where p and q are distinct 
primes congruent to 3 mod 4 and u is a quadratic residue modn. SQRp is clearly in 
NP, because the following algorithm determines membership of (u, n): guess the 
factorization of n, verify that both factors are prime, using Pratt’s algorithm [Pra], 
guess a square root a of U, and verify that a2 = u mod n. Similarly, SQRp is in NP: 
given a pair (u, n), we can show in nondeterministic polynomial time either that 
the real prime factorization of n has the wrong form, that u is not relatively prime 
to n, or that u is of the form ( - 1) . a2 for some a. The functions k( ) and E in the 
encryption scheme given for QRP in Section 3 together form a l/2-random-self- 
reduction for SQRP. The sets associated with the problems DLP and PRP from 
Section 3 are also 52( 1 )-random-self-reducible. 
It is natural to ask whether there is an NP-complete set that is c-random-self- 
reducible for some constant c. This question makes sense only if the set is encoded 
succinctly, as the set SQRp is in the discussion above. If we do not insist on a 
succinct encoding, then we can start with a standard encoding of SAT; pad every 
instance of length n with n bits of garbage, and achieve a l/2-random-self-reduction 
by fixing the meaningful part of the instance and randomizing the garbage. The 
folklore that suggests that one cannot base a one-way function on an NP-complete 
set also suggests that NP-complete sets are not c-random-self-reducible, because of 
the connection between one-way functions and random-self-reducibility drawn in 
CALI. 
Along these lines, we can show that CoNP-hard sets are not O(logn/n)-random- 
self-reducible, unless the PH collapses at the third level; this follows from 
Corollary 3, because an O(log n/n)-random-self-reduction is just a special case of a 
one-sided encryption function that leaks O(log n) bits. 
In the same vein, it is easy to show directly that if SAT is O-random-self- 
reducible, then NP = CoNP. Suppose that t is a O-random-self-reduction for SAT. 
We can use it to build an NP algorithm for SAT. On input X, the algorithm first 
generates a string y of the form FALSE A FALSE A . . . A FALSE, where 1 J:/ = Ix/ 
(y is just a known SAT instance of length /xl). Then the algorithm nondeter- 
ministically guesses a k and verifies that t(x, k) = y; if so, it accepts x. An 
appropriate k must exist, because t is a O-random-self-reduction. 
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We can combine the results of [BHZ, For, TW] to prove a related result. Tompa 
and Woll have a stricter definition of random-self-reducibility that they use to prove 
that, if S is random-self-reducible in their sense, then it has a perfect zero- 
knowledge proof system. If S has a perfect zero-knowledge proof system, then S is 
in AM[2] [For]. If CoNP is contained in AM[2], then the PH collapses at the 
second level [BHZ]. Thus, NP-complete sets are also unlikely to be random-self- 
reducible, in the sense of Tompa and Woll. In a forthcoming paper, Nisan shows 
that NP-hard sets are not O(log n/n)-random-self-reducible (according to our 
definition), unless the PH collapses at the second level [N]. 
Finally, we would like to point out that there is a l/2-random-self-reducible set in 
NP that is not known to be in CoNP. Let S be the set of pairs of isomorphic 
graphs (G,, G,). The mapping that leaves G, fixed and takes G2 to the graph 
induced by a random permutation of V(G,) is a l/2-random-self-reduction. 
6. OPEN PROBLEMS 
Question 1. We have presented general results about the encryptability of NP- 
hard functions and expected-polynomial-time computable functions, and we have 
presented examples of encryption schemes for functions that are believed to be 
neither NP-hard nor expected-polynomial-time computable. However, we have no 
general results about such functions. Is FACTORING encryptable leaking at most 
Ixl? Is FACTORING random-self-reducible? 
Question 2. Suppose that SAT is encryptable leaking at most L, where 
Dam(L) = (0, l}*, LENPSV/~O~~, and IL(x)1 = O(log log Ix]). Does the PH 
collapse below the third level? 
Question 3. Suppose that SAT is encryptable leaking at most L, where 
Dam(L) = (0, 1 } *, L E NPSV/poly, and I L(x)1 = [x1/2. Does the PH collapse at the 
ith level for some i? Note that this question is interesting only if instances are 
encoded succinctly. 
Question 4. As we saw above, graph isomorphism is l/2-random-self-reducible. 
Is it encryptable hiding at least the isomorphism classes of the input graphs? 
Question 5. Can player A encrypt SAT leaking at most 1x1 if she is allowed to 
query several oracles Bi, B,, . . . . B, that cannot communicate with each other? Can 
she encrypt any functions that the cannot encrypt by querying only one oracle? 
Note added in proof: Beaver and Feigenbaum have recently obtained a positive answer to this 
question; preliminary report appears in [BF]. 
APPENDIX A 
In [Yao82, Yao86a], Yao announced a protocol by which A, who has a secret 
input i, and B, who has a secret input j, can compute the value f(i, j), while neither 
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reveals to the other anything about the secret inputs that is not implied by f(i, j). 
In [Yao82, Yao86a], A needs the cooperation of B because she does not know j, 
rather than because she lacks the power to evaluatef: In Yao’s model, the players A 
and B are equally powerful, and they have fairness as a goal, as well as validity and 
privacy. The proof that the protocol achieves these goals uses the quadratic 
residuosity assumption (QRA), and hence the functions f that are considered are 
all efficiently computable. 
The goal of a zero-knowledge proof system [GHY85, GMR] for the predicate f’ 
is to allow A to prove to B that f(x) = E, E E (0, 1 }, without incidentally leaking 
more information about x than this single bit. There, A, the player who hides 
something, is at least as powerful as B, from whom she hides it. Often, A’s advan- 
tage is based on the possession of trapdoor information. In contrast, the goal of an 
encryption function for f is to allow A to compute .f(x) with the help of B without 
revealing to B anything except L(X). Here, A is the weaker player and must conceal 
something from someone with more resources. There is no element of proof in our 
framework as it stands. 
For example, the goal of a zero-knowledge proof system for SAT would be for A 
to take a propositional formula F that is known to both A and B and convince B 
that she knows a model for F without telling him anything about what that model 
is. Such proof systems were exhibited independently in [BCC, GMW]. The goal of 
an encryption scheme for SAT would be for A to transform F, which is not known to 
B, into another formula G such that A can deduce the satisfiability of F from that of 
G without revealing L(F). We know that, if C,‘# n[, then such an encryption 
scheme does not exist for any L such that Dam(L) = {0, 1 )*, L E NPSV/poly and 
IL(F)1 = @log IFI ). 
If f has both an encryption scheme and a zero-knowledge proof system, then the 
two can be combined in a protocol by which B can convince A that he has a proof 
that f‘(x) = Z, say, without revealing any information about what the proof is or 
learning what x is. For example, there is such a protocol for the discrete logarithm 
function. 
APPENDIX B 
The following lemma was stated without proof in [AFK]. It extends a result in 
[KL]. Similar extensions can be found in, e.g., [BBS, Sch, Yap]. 
LEMMA. If NP c (NP n CoNP)/poly, then the PH collapses at the second level, 
i.e., C,’ = nc. 
Proof: This is a purely technical extension of Kasp and Lipton’s proof that 
NP s P/poly implies that n; = C; (Theorem 6.1 of [KL]). The two major steps in 
their proof, i.e., the inductive step and the final use of the recursive definition of the 
n[-complete problem, can be made to work for sets SE NP n CoNP without 
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assuming that SEP. For readers unfamiliar with the techniques of [KL], we give 
our strengthened version of the proof: 
First we show by induction that 
NP E (NP n CoNP)/poly * PH E (NP n CoNP)/poly. 
Let Ei be the set of encodings of true sentences of the form 
(6) 
QlXl &x2 . ..QixiF(xl. x2, . . . . xi), 
where Q, = 3, the Qi are alternately 3 and V, xi is a vector of Zj boolean variables, 
and F is a polynomial-time predicate. Let A, be defined identically, except that the 
roles of 3 and V are reversed. It is known that Ei is CP-complete and that Ai 
is np-complete, under logspace reductions [Sto]. Because (NP n CoNP)/poly 
is closed under complementation [Yap], Ai E (NP n CoNP)/poly o Ei E 
(NP n CoNP)/poly. (Here, Karp and Lipton use closure under complementation of 
P/poly.) To prove (6), we show that Eie (NP n CoNP)/poly, for all i. 
By hypothesis, E, E (NP n CoNP)/poly. We proceed by induction on i Assume 
that Ei_ 1 E (NP n CoNP)/poly (and hence that Ai_ 1 E (NP n CoNP)/poly). Thus, 
there is a set SE NP n CoNP, a constant k, and an advice function h such that 
Ih( <nk and x~A~_,oh(lxl).x~S. 
If y is the encoding of a sentence in Ei or A,, and a is a vector of I, boolean 
variables, then we use y, to denote the encoding of the sentence obtained from y by 
deleting the quantifier Qr and substituting a for x1 in F(xl, x2, . . . . xi). We can do 
the encoding and the substitution in such a way that I y, I = I yl for all y and a. 
Let T = { wy : 3a such that wy, E S}. Because SE NP, there is a polynomial-time 
predicate F such that 
S= {x: 3bF(b, x)}. 
Thus 
T= (wy: 3a 3bF(b, WY,)} ENP. 
Here, Karp and Lipton used their assumption that SE P. 
By inductive hypothesis, 
yeEio3a suchthat JI,EA~_, 
-flu suchthat h(ly,I).y,~S. 
But I Y,I = IA. So 
3asuchthath(ly,l),y,ESoh(lyl).yET. 
By the hypothesis that NPz (NPnCoNP)/poly, we have TE (NPnCoNP)/ 
poly, and thus there is a set S’ E NP n CoNP, an integer k’, and an advice function 
h’ such that 
Ih’(n)l < nk’ 
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and 
Thus, 
Now h’( lh( 1 ~1). yl ) . h( 1 y\ ) is a polynomial advice function whose value depends 
only on 1 yl, and s’ E NP n CoNP. This establishes that Ei~ (NP n CoNP)/poly 
and completes the proof of (6). 
Next, we complete the proof of the lemma by showing 
NP c (NP n CoNP)/poly =z. fi G $. (7) 
3 2 
It sufIices to show that the hypothesis implies that A3 is in C,‘. The proof is based 
on the following recursive definition of A,. Let y be a sentence of the form 
Q~x~Qzxz . ..Q.,-M’(x,, ~2, . ..> x,), 
where the string of quantifiers Q, Q2. .. Q, is in V*3*V* (note that these boolean 
variables x,, . . . . x, are not vectors as above). Let 
y’= Q2x2 . ..Q.x,F(O, x2, . . . . x,) 
and 
y” = Q2x2 . . . Q”x,F( 1, x2, . . . . x,). 
Then the characteristic function C,, for A, satisfies 
The function C,, is uniquely determined by its values on the set of quantifier-free 
sentences and by this recursive definition, which has the form 
C,,(Y) = R(_Y, C&Y’), G,(Y”)). 
By (6), A3 E (NP n CoNP)/poly. Thus A, = S: h, where SE NP n CoNP and 
lh(n)16nk. ForeachwE{O, l}*,definef,,,: (0, l}*-+ (0, I} byf,(x)=lowxES. 
Then, for each y that contains at least one quantifier, membership of y in A, is 
expressed by the formula: 
3w VZCf,(Y) = 1 * f,(z) = R(z, .Mz’), fwb”))l. (8) 
Here w ranges over all strings of length at most ( y( k, and z ranges over all strings of 
length I yl. We interpret (8) as follows: y is in A, if and only if there is some w such 
571/39/l-4 
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that fW( JJ) = 1. This particular f, is really the characteristic function for A, if and 
only if, for all z, f,(z) = R(z, f,,,(z'), fw(z")). Karp and Lipton were able to finish the 
proof by saying that 
is clearly in P, because S is in P. Here SE NP n CoNP, and we wish to show that V 
is in CoNP. Once we have shown that, we will have (8) in the form 
3~ Vz V6G(w, z, 6, y), (9) 
for some polynomial-time predicate G, and we will be able to merge the two univer- 
sal quantifiers in (9) to have A3 in the form ( y : 3w VcG(w, c, y)}. This will mean 
that A 3 E Cp, which in turn will imply (7) and complete the proof of the lemma. 
The remainder of the proof is highly technical and the formulas may be 
somewhat intimidating. Essentially, the fact we need is that if two formulas can 
both be checked by NP machines and by CoNP machines, then their equivalence 
can also be checked by an NP machine and by a CoNP machine. 
Because SECONP, {y:f,(y)=l} has the form {y:Vc,G,(c,, WY)}, for some 
polynomial-time predicate G, . Next consider 
u= {z:fw(z)=~(z,fw(z'),fw(z"))}. 
If we expand the definitions off and R, we can write this in the form 
U={z:[wz~Sr\ [ifQ,(z)=Vthen[wz’ES~ w~“~S]else[wz’~Sv wz”~S]]] 
v [wz$S~ [ifQ(z)=V then [wz’$S~ wz”$S] else [wz’$S v wz”$S]]]}. 
Because SE NP, SE CoNP, and hence S has the form ( y : VczG,(c,, y)} for some 
polynomial-time predicate G2. Thus, V is of the form (9) and is hence in CoNP. 
The universally quantified variable b is the vector clcZ and the polynomial-time 
predicate G is 
G(w, z, b, .JJ) = G,(c,, Y) 
A [[G,(c,, wz) A [ifQ,(z)=V then [Gi(c,, wz’) A G,(c,, wz”)] 
else [Gi(ci, wz’) v G1(cl, wz”)]]] 
v [GZ(cZ, wz) A [if Q,(z) = V then [GZ(cZ, wz’) A G,(c,, wz”)] 
else [GZ(cZ, wz’) v Gz(cz, wz”)]]]]. 
The fact that A3 E CoNP implies that Cc G nl. This in turn implies that c,’ C n,‘, 
and, by symmetry, that Cp = nc. I 
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